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A COMMENT ON "DUE PROCESS OF
LAW"
RAouL BERGER*
The dialogue between Professor Randall Bridwell and my-
self' has served to clarify the issues and to develop large areas of
agreement. Our differences are minor, with one exception-due
process-and that may be due to a misunderstanding that can
be dissipated. It turns, however, on what is the clearest and most
important definition of due process in our constitutional history,
so important that its meaning must not be obscured.
On the eve of the Philadelphia Convention, Hamilton stated
in the New York Assembly that "[tihe words 'due process' have
a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process
and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be re-
ferred to an act of legislature."' 2 Professor Bridwell correctly un-
derstands me to read this as meaning that due process "embod-
ied no substantive restrictions on legislative action . . . to
which a court could resort to . . . overturn legislation." 3 But,
he continues, "when understood in its full context, however,
Hamilton probably meant the very opposite . . ."
The "very opposite" of "never" is "always," and Bridwell
therefore suggests that due process authorizes "substantive re-
strictions on legislative action." 5 Bridwell hardly means that due
process "always" applies to statutes and authorizes such "sub-
stantive restrictions," for he states that due process "requires
some restrictions on legislative actions that differ greatly from
the previous 'substantive due process' inventions of the Supreme
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, 1962-65; Charles Warren
Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University, 1971-76. A.B., University
of Cincinnati, 1932; J.D., Northwestern University, 1935; LL.M., Harvard University,
1938; LL.D., University of Michigan, 1978.
1. Bridwell, The Federal Judiciary: America's Recently Liberated Minority, 30
S.C.L. REv. 467 (1979); Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review: A Continuing Dialogue, 31
S.C.L. REv. 171 (1980); Bridwell, The Scope of Judicial Review: A Dirge for the Theorists
of Majority Rule?, 31 S.C.L. REV. 617 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bridwell, Judicial
Review].
2. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962)(em-
phasis added in part) [hereinafter cited as A. HAMILTON].
3. Bridwell, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 626 (emphasis added).
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. Id.
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Court."6 The sole "restriction on legislative action" urged by
Hamilton was that disqualification from holding office required
judicial proceedings. Nowhere did he repudiate his statement
that due process applied "only" to judicial proceedings. His ar-
gument, rather, was that due process required trial before con-
demnation, a right no statute could curtail. With this I agree,
and may add that my studies were exclusively concerned with
the "substantive" application of due process "to overturn legisla-
tion" on policy grounds; it never entered my mind that my anal-
ysis could be read to condone statutory denial of a constitutional
right to trial.
At issue was an amendment to an Act of February 1787, 7
which had earlier passed over Hamilton's opposition. The Act
disqualified officers of war vessels and privateers who had en-
gaged in hostilities against Americans during the Revolutionary
War from holding "any office . . . of trust"8 in the state. It was
aimed at Loyalists who had aided the "enemy." The proposed
amendment added the "owners" of such vessels Hamilton
maintained that due process required "a judicial proceeding
before anyone can be deprived of a right"; and he objected that
the amendment would "directly deprive the shipowners of their
rights without a judicial proceeding . . .,,
It was the purpose of Magna Carta by the "law of the land"
clause to assure that no man could be condemned without trial."
A fourteenth century statute provided that he must be "brought
in to answer by due process of law. 1 2 A few centuries later Coke
explained that due process meant that "[n]o man may be put to
answer without presentment"'3 or by proper writ, what we would
term service of proper process. "Put to answer" meant "put on
trial." Pointing to the New York declaration of rights guarantee
6. Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
7. An Act for Regulating Elections, ch. 15, 1785-88 Laws of New York 371 (1787).
8. Id. at 383. See A. HAMMTON, supra note 2,-at 34-35 n.1.
9. See A. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 34-35 n.1.
10. Bridwell, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 626 (quoting R. Whitten, The Consti-
tutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction-An Historical Interpretative Reexrami-
nation of the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, Part II, at 36 (1979)).
11. Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 3 (1979).
12. Cited in R. BERGER, GovERNmENT sy JUDIcIARY: THE TRANsFORMAION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 197 (1977).
13. Quoted in id. at 198.
14. Ex parte Walker, [1924] 24 N.S.W. 604, 616.
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(passed by statute "in the same session") that "no man shall be
• . .deprived of any right, but by due process of law," Hamil-
ton maintained that the disqualification act violated due process
by condemning without trial.' 5 Where a constitution, for exam-
ple, guarantees trial by jury, no statute may deprive a man of
that right.'6 Similarly, a guarantee of "judicial proceedings" is
violated by a statute providing for disqualification without trial.
Hamilton justly rejected the argument that the disqualification
statute could be justified because "the law of the land will in-
clude an act of the legislature," pointing out that Coke inter-
preted "the law of the land to mean presentment and indictment
... " Literally any "act" is part of the "law of the land," but
it would be self-defeating to read that phrase to include an "act"
which violates the very guarantee that "law of the land" was
meant to protect.
Bridwell's authority, Professor Whitten, mistakenly con-
cludes from the foregoing that
[t]his is why the words "due process of law," in [Hamilton's]
view, could "never be referred to an Act of the legislature": be-
cause an act of the legislature could not satisfy the requirement
of due process of law and was thus a violation of provisions that
required due process-i.e., judicial proceedings."
For an act could satisfy due process by securing the judicial pro-
ceeding not provided by the disqualification statute. Hamilton
was interested in obtaining a trial, not in transforming due pro-
cess into an instrument of judicial control over all legislation. In
England "law of the land" never was regarded as a limitation on
the legislature;' 9 and the colonial materials, including those of
New York, identified due process with the right to be brought
into court, while preserving the legislative freedom to enact legis-
lation. 0 Hamilton's statement, therefore, epitomized 400 years of
English and colonial history.
Bridwell, I presume, would not argue that because no stat-
ute may deprive a man of guaranteed "procedural" rights, it fol-
15. A. HAAIILTON, supra note 2, at 35-36.
16. See Berger, supra note 11, at 14-16.
17. A. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 35.
18. Bridwell, Judicial Reuiew, supra note 1, at 626-27 (quoting R. Whitten, supra
note 10, at 36) (emphasis added).
19. Berger, supra note 11, at 5.
20. Id. at 8-9.
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lows that courts are empowered to set aside a minimum-wage
law. In other words, due process bars legislative deprivation of
the right to judicial proceedings before condemnation; it does
not enpower courts to set legislation aside on "substantive"
grounds. Bridwell and I are at one in thrusting aside the "'sub-
stantive due process' inventions of the Supreme Court,"2' and I
fully concur that procedural rights protected by due process can-
not be taken away by statute.
But an historian may not stop here-there was an exception
from due process for the disqualification act; it was one of the
many attainders against Loyalists passed in almost every one of
the thirteen states during the Revolution.2 Attainders were legis-
lative condemnations without trial; they were almost as old as
the term "due process" and were employed by Parliament well
into the eighteenth century.? But the disqualification act was a
"bill of pains and penalties" rather than a "bill of attainder"
because it contained no death penalty. 2' New York enacted an
earlier legislative forfeiture in 1779;21 there were English prece-
dents for disqualification from office by such bills. And the act
had the sanction of the New York Constitution: "no acts of at-
tainder shall be passed by the legislature of this State for crimes,
other than those committed before the termination of the pre-
sent war . . .
Hamilton was out of tune with the bitter anti-Loyalist senti-
ment of the revolutionists;2 his biographer stated that Hamilton
"felt a sense of kinship with the Loyalists" because "they were
wealthy and conservative members of society to whom he looked
for aid against the radicalism that seemed to threaten the estab-
lished social order," even though they "had chosen the wrong
side in the struggle." He had been counsel for a wealthy Loyal-
ist in 1784 in a suit, Rutgers v. Waddington,3" by a "patriot" who
21. Bridwell, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 627.
22. Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment by the Court, 63 CoRNELL L.
REv. 355, 377-79 (1978).
23. Id. at 374.
24. Id. at 356.57.
25. See id. at 379 n.159.
26. See id. at 376.
27. Quoted in id. at 377.
28. Id. at 384-85.
29. Quoted in id. at 385.
30. Cited in id. at 383.
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had fled the British occupation of New York and sought to re-
cover for the use of her property. The decision went in part for
Hamilton and provoked violent criticism; the assembly de-
nounced the judgment as "subversive of all law and good or-
der." All of which helps to explain why Hamilton stood almost
alone in the 1787 assembly in protesting against the disqualifica-
tion statute.
31. Quoted in id. at 383-84.
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